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Abstract 
We present empirical evidence of the international emissions impact from climate change 
legislation in 98 countries between 1997 and 2017, using data from Climate Change Laws of the 
World. Unlike traditional measures of carbon leakage, we focus on net carbon imports, that is, the 
difference between consumption and production emissions. Using different estimation techniques, 
we estimate the impact on carbon intensity of two legislation variables, recent legislation (passed 
in the last 3 years) and older legislation (passed more than 3 years ago). We find that recent 
legislation reduces production emissions more than consumption emissions, while older laws have 
a bigger impact on consumption emissions. The combined effect of these changes on net carbon 
imports is very small. Overall, we find no evidence that domestic climate legislation has increased 
international carbon leakage over the past two decades. Indeed, in high-income countries the long-
run leakage rate may even be negative. 
JEL codes: F18, K32, Q54, Q56, Q58. 
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1. Introduction  
The international policy response to climate change is uneven. The three largest greenhouse 
gas emitters – China, the European Union and the United States – have now committed to reduce 
their emissions to “net zero” by the middle of the century, that is, to balance any remaining 
emissions with the removal of carbon from the atmosphere, for example through afforestation. 
Close to two thirds of global greenhouse gas emissions are now subject to a net zero emissions 
commitment (Black et al. 2021). However, there is considerable heterogeneity in the way these 
targets are implemented, and indeed in the degree to which they may be adhered to.   
The premise of the Paris Agreement is that in time this patchwork of nationally determined 
contributions will add up to a climate outcome that is both equitable (reflecting countries’ common 
but differentiated responsibilities) and aligned with the Paris objective of keeping the global 
temperature rise well below 2°C and ideally at 1.5°C. Once this is achieved, it can be left to the 
market to determine where economic activity takes place within a socially optimal, or at least 
politically acceptable, system of regulatory regimes. 
However, in the short term there is considerable anxiety about the high level of policy 
heterogeneity. Environmentalists are concerned that it leads to carbon leakage, that is, the migration 
of high-emissions activities from relatively tight regulatory environments to more lenient 
jurisdictions. Industry representatives worry about competitiveness, that is, the associated loss of 
jobs and market share.  
Policy makers have devised a host of potential measures to mitigate the real or perceived risk 
of carbon offshoring, including targeted policy exemptions, financial compensation (e.g., in the 
form of free emission allowances or tax rebates) and border carbon adjustments (Böhringer et al. 
2012; Dröge et al. 2009; Fischer and Fox 2012; Martin et al. 2014; Schmidt and Heitzig 2014).  
These interventions command considerable policy attention. For example, a Carbon Border 
Adjustment Mechanism is a centrepiece of the European Union’s climate package for 2030.  
 Academic interest in carbon leakage is equally extensive and as old as the literature on the 
economics of climate change itself (see Fankhauser (1995) for an early account). A recent 
systematic review by Yu et al. (2021) identified over 400 relevant studies.  A related long-standing 
literature studies the “pollution haven effect” of uneven environmental regulation, often in the 
context of local pollution (Copeland and Taylor 2004). Research on clean innovation, in contrast, 
has highlighted the potential for beneficial spillover effects, which facilitate the dissemination low-
carbon technologies (Aghion and Jaravel 2015; Acemoglu et al. 2014).  
However, despite nearly three decades of analysis, there is little consensus on the likely 
magnitude, or indeed the sign, of carbon leakage. 
This paper provides an empirical ex post account of the impact of national climate change 
policy and legislation on international carbon emissions between 1997 and 2017. We use the 
difference between countries’ production emissions (the amount of carbon emitted within country 
boundaries) and consumption emissions (the amount of carbon embedded in national consumption) 
to derive the carbon trade balance of 98 countries, that is, the difference between their carbon 
imports and exports. 
Methodologically, the paper draws on Eskander and Fankhauser (2020), who use a similar 
approach, but deal solely with production emissions. We construct a simple theoretical model 
where national climate legislation affects the carbon trade balance of a country in four ways: first, 
by reducing the carbon content of its exports; second, by changing international demand for its 
exports; third, by changing domestic demand for imports; and, fourth, by changing the carbon 
content of those imports, for example through fuel substitution or spillover effects.  
We then use Climate Change Laws of the World,1 a comprehensive global database of national 
climate change legislation, to estimate econometrically the combined impact of these factors on net 
carbon imports. Climate Change Laws of the World adopts a broad definition of climate legislation, 
including parliamentary acts, executive orders and policies of equivalent importance 
(Averchenkova et al. 2017).  
The data have been collected over a decade (Townshend et al. 2011,  2013) and cover the full 
range of interventions that is relevant to reducing greenhouse gas emissions, from framework laws 
(such as, the UK Climate Change Act) and dedicated climate measures (e.g., New Zealand’s 
Climate Change Response (Emissions Trading) Amendment) to sector policies on energy (e.g., 
Germany’s Renewable Energy Sources Act), transport (e.g., Brazil’s Mandatory Biodiesel 
Requirements) and forestry (e.g., the Democratic Republic of Congo’s Law on Protection of the 
Nature).   
The comprehensiveness and breadth of the data make them well suited to analyse the aggregate 
impact of all climate change measures in a country, and it gives us confidence that the relationships 
we find reflect the impact of law making, rather than a spurious correlation.  
The paper departs from the existing carbon leakage literature by proposing a new metric for 
leakage rates. Carbon leakage is defined as the impact of climate policy on the import and export 
of carbon emissions, rather than the more customary focus on production emissions abroad (an 
 
1 Available at https://climate-laws.org/. 
exception is Franzen and Mader 2018). We believe that this metric allows a sharper focus on what 
policy makers are ultimately interested in, namely the carbon emissions from actions that are under 
their control (domestic consumption, exports, imports), while ignoring those that are not 
(consumption abroad).   
The paper also breaks new ground by offering an empirical ex post account of long-term carbon 
leakage at the country level, combining for the first time Global Carbon Budget data (Friedlingstein 
et al. 2020)2 with global climate legislation data (Climate Change Laws of the World; 
Averchenkova et al. 2017). Previous attempts to estimate global leakage rates predominantly rely 
on ex ante simulation models (usually, computable general equilibrium models). There is an 
empirical ex post literature, but it has focused almost exclusively on competitiveness effects, rather 
than leakage, and it is mainly interested in firm-level impacts, not the aggregate, global picture 
(e.g., Dechezleprêtre et al. 2021; Naegele and Zaklan 2019). 
We find that the passage of new climate change laws has had a significant and negative effect 
on both production emissions and consumption emissions, particularly over the longer term. The 
combined impact on net carbon imports (the difference between consumption and production 
emissions) has been small.  Over the short term (within three years of passing a law) the impact is 
not statistically significant. Over the long term (beyond three years), we find a small negative 
leakage rate in high-income countries. The results are robust to a number of alternative 
specifications and the use of different estimation techniques (two-way fixed effect panel regression; 
generalised method of moments and Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimation).  
 
2 Available at www.globalcarbonproject.org. 
Although the literature allows for this possibility (Acemoglu et al. 2014; Copeland and Taylor 
2005; Gerlagh and Kuik 2014), finding negative leakage rates is unexpected. The result will require 
further analytical scrutiny to identify the exact drivers of the negative effect. In the meantime, we 
can stipulate with some confidence that domestic climate legislation has not increased international 
carbon leakage over the past two decades. This should allay fears in policy circles about the 
international impact of unilateral climate action. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides further background, putting 
the paper in the context of the existing literature on carbon leakage and setting out a simple 
theoretical model to guide our analysis. Section 3 introduces the empirical method, including a 
discussion of the data and our econometric estimation strategy. Section 4 presents the results and 
section 5 concludes. 
2. Background  
2.1 Carbon leakage channels  
Domestic climate action can affect carbon emissions abroad through a variety of channels. 
Game-theoretic papers (e.g., Bohm 1993; Carraro and Siniscalco 1993; Nordhaus 2015) emphasise 
the risk of free-riding. In a global cooperation game, countries have fewer incentives to act on 
climate change if the worst impacts have already been prevented through the actions of others. This 
analytical angle has somewhat lost in prominence, perhaps because the global narrative has shifted 
from burden sharing to green growth opportunities (e.g., Fankhauser et al. 2013; Stern 2015). 
However, the reluctance of parties to the Paris Agreement to ratchet up their commitments (or 
nationally determined contributions) could arguably be interpreted through a free-rider lens.  
Most other carbon leakage channels work through general equilibrium effects.  In a general 
equilibrium context with free trade, unilateral climate policy may affect international emissions 
through price effects, trade effects or income effects. The first two are most widely studied and 
generally result in positive leakage rates, that is, an increase in international emissions. 
The price effect is straightforward. A climate policy-induced reduction in the demand for 
carbon-intensive goods (say, for fossil fuels) in some countries could lower their global price and 
lead to a partial rebound in demand elsewhere (Harstad 2012; Kuik and Gerlagh 2003). The channel 
is similar to the mechanism that gives rise to the so-called “green paradox” (Jensen et al. 2015; 
Sinn 2012), and it requires high-regulation countries to be of sufficient size to influence 
international markets.  
Trade effects work through changes in relative costs, rather than absolute prices. High-carbon 
industries that are subject to climate policy or legislation may suffer a loss of competitiveness, and 
carbon-intensive production may shift from highly regulated to less regulated jurisdictions. The 
argumentation is similar to the debate about “pollution haven” effects (Copeland and Taylor 2004; 
Levinson and Taylor 2008).  
The magnitude of price and trade effects depends on industry structure, trade restrictions, 
substitution possibilities and the price elasticity of demand (Barker et al. 2007). The less price 
elastic the demand for carbon-intensive goods, the more the policy shock will be absorbed through 
price adjustments, rather than changes in the equilibrium quantity consumed. Differences in the 
price elasticity between high-carbon and low-carbon substitutes (say, between coal and gas), 
combined with a high elasticity of substitution, can dampen or exacerbate the effect.   
Trade effects further depend on the degree to which goods of different origin are substitutes, 
with noticeably higher leakage rates in models that assume perfect substitution. Leakage rates are 
also higher if regulated firms were already less polluting before regulation kicked in (Fowlie 2009). 
They may increase further if there are increasing returns to scale in the high-carbon good, which 
producers in the under-regulated jurisdiction can start to exploit (Babiker 2005). The presence of 
oligopolistic market power, rather than perfect competition, may further complicate the picture 
(Ritz 2009). 
The income effect is less well studied, but is interesting because it opens up the possibility of 
negative leakage rates.  If unilateral action raises incomes in the non-regulating country, this may 
increase demand for environmental quality and therefore incentivise the non-regulating country to 
also reduce its emissions (Copeland and Taylor 2005).  
A final effect, which may also lead to lower international emissions, is technology spillovers 
(Acemoglu et al. 2012, 2014; Aghion and Jaravel 2015; Gerlagh and Kuik 2014). In line with the 
Porter hypothesis (Porter and van der Linde 1995), climate policy and legislation may bestow a 
comparative advantage on regulated firms, which are forced to innovate and become more cost-
effective. In a world that is gradually decarbonising, they will have a competitive edge.  Through 
technology spillovers, these cleaner products and production processes may in time also be adopted 
by unregulated firms (contradicting in part the predictions of the pollution haven literature).  
There is empirical little agreement on the relative importance of these different effects. 
Simulation models typically find leakage rates (defined as the ratio of the change in international 
and domestic emissions) in the order of 5-30 percent (Barker et al. 2007; Branger and and Quirion 
2014; Yu et al. 2021), but this can fall to nearly zero or exceed 100 percent with the right 
combination of price elasticities, substitution effects, technology spillovers and returns to scale.  
Leakage rates may even turn negative.  
Empirical ex post studies of leakage or competitiveness effects generally find a small or 
negligible impact (Dechezleprêtre and Sato 2017; Verde 2020), although there are some exceptions 
(Aichele and Felbermayer 2015). The same ambiguity is found in studies of specific sectors, such 
as aluminium, cement and steel, where leakage rates range from negligible (Branger et al. 2016; 
Sartor 2013) to substantial (Dröge et al. 2009).  Further empirical validation of leakage effects is 
therefore valuable. 
2.2 Analytical framework 
Our empirical investigation is guided by a simple analytical framework for domestic and trade-
related carbon emissions. The starting point is a simplified version of the standard macroeconomic 
expression for aggregate demand 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 +  (𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 − 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖),           (1) 
where 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖, denotes national output (or aggregate demand) in country i,  𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖, is domestic consumption, 
𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 is exports and 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖.is imports. That is, the expression in brackets denotes the trade balance. For 
simplicity, we ignore investment and government consumption.  
In a one-good, two-country economy, there will be a relative price 𝜋𝜋∗, which determines 
country i’s terms of trade and ensures that aggregate demand equals aggregate supply. The 
components of aggregate demand depend on price in the normal way: 
𝛿𝛿𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖
𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿
= 𝐶𝐶′ < 0;   𝛿𝛿𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖
𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿
= 𝐸𝐸′ < 0;   𝛿𝛿𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖
𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿
= 𝐼𝐼′ > 0      (2) 
National consumption and international demand for exports depend negatively on price. 
Imports, or international supply, depend positively on the relative price of the domestic good.  
We move from economic output to greenhouse gas emissions by multiplying each aggregate 
demand component with the relevant emissions factor. Denoting production or territorial emissions 
as 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  and consumption or embedded emissions as 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,  we have 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 = 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 +  𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖       (3) 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 = 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 +  𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖        (4) 
where 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 is the emissions factor for domestically produced output and 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓 is the emissions factor for 
imports, i.e., for production abroad. Note that imported emissions do not enter the equation for 
production emissions, as they will be accounted for in the country of origin. Similarly, when 
calculation consumption emissions, export-related emissions are accounted for in the destination 
country where consumption takes place. 
Net carbon imports are then the difference between consumption and production emissions, or 
the difference in the carbon content of imports and exports 
 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖  − 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 = 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 −  𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖             (5) 
We can now introduce changes in climate change policy and legislation. The purpose of passing 
a climate law in country i is to reduce the emissions coefficient 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖, but because emission abatement 
affects costs, passing the law may also change the equilibrium price 𝜋𝜋∗. Through technology 
spillovers or scale effects, the new law may also affect the carbon intensity of international 
production 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓.  
Denoting the stock of climate laws in country 𝑖𝑖 as 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖, we find the following impacts of an 
additional law on production and consumption emissions: 
𝛿𝛿𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖
𝛿𝛿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖
= 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖′(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖) + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖′ + 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖′) 𝜋𝜋′    (6) 
𝛿𝛿𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖
𝛿𝛿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖







 and  𝜋𝜋′ = 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿
𝛿𝛿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖
.  Equation (6) is the impact of climate legislation on 
production emissions estimated by Eskander and Fankhauser (2020). The first expression measures 
the impact of a lower emissions intensity, that is, the partial decarbonisation of domestic 
consumption and exports. The second expression measures the response of domestic and 
international demand to the regulatory cost of climate legislation.   
The same effects are at play in the effect on consumption emissions in equation (7). Domestic 
consumption gets part-decarbonised and the carbon intensity of imports might change indirectly 
through income, spillover or scale effects (first expression). Consumers respond to the higher price 
by reducing their consumption (second expression) and to the altered terms of trade by switching 
to imports, which have become relatively cheaper. 
We can bring the impact of climate legislation on international emissions together by taking 





  =  (𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓′  𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 −  𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖′ 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖) +(𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖′  −  𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖′)𝜋𝜋′    (8) 
Passing a climate law in country i has four international effects. The first two work through the 
change in the carbon intensity of imports and exports. Exports are decarbonised directly through 
the regulation of production emissions, while the carbon intensity of imports may change 
indirectly, through spillover or scale effects. The third and fourth effect work through changes in 
the terms of trade. Passing a climate law leads to a reduction in the demand for exports from country 
i, as carbon regulation has made them relatively more expensive. At the same time there may be 
an increase in imports, which have become relatively cheaper and gain market share at the expense 
of domestic output.  
We do not make any a priori assumptions about the relative importance, and indeed in some 
cases the sign, of these four effects, but in the next section we will estimate their combined effect 
on the carbon trade balance (net carbon imports) empirically.  
Before doing so, it is worth comparing our leakage measure (equations 8 and 5) to the standard 
metric for carbon leakage, which is typically defined as the change in international production 
emissions, divided by the change in domestic production emissions: 





�         (9). 
We can derive the expression for international production emissions, 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓, by adapting equation 
(3) and noting that  𝐸𝐸𝑓𝑓 = 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖, i.e., the exports by the rest of the world equal the imports of country i. 
𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓 =  𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓 𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓 +  𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖    (10). 
The comparison of equations (5) and (10) reveals the philosophical difference between the two 
measures. The traditional leakage metric is determined heavily by the impact of domestic policies 
on foreign consumption (component 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓 in equation 10). This is an outcome over which policy 
makers in country i do not, and indeed should not, have any influence. Our alternative metric 
ignores foreign consumption and instead emphasise the carbon content of country 𝑖𝑖’s exports 
(component 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 in equation 5) over which its policy makers do have control.  The new metric is 
therefore much more policy-relevant to decision makers in country 𝑖𝑖. 
3. Empirical approach  
3.1 Identification strategy  
Following Eskander and Fankhauser (2020), we assume that a country’s carbon emissions, 
under both production and consumption accounting rules, are a function of its track record in 
climate policy. Climate policy, in turn is codified in parliamentary acts, government edicts and 
executive orders, which we collectively refer to as “climate laws”. In the most general model, 
emissions intensity (that is, carbon emissions per GDP) in year 𝑡𝑡 would be a function of legal 
history, that is, of the climate laws passed in year (𝑡𝑡 − 1), (𝑡𝑡 − 2), (𝑡𝑡 − 3) and so on, each lag with 
a different weight to reflect the time dynamics of new laws (for example, the time it takes for 
regulations to take effect).  
However, to avoid excessive lags we aggregate legislative history into two time periods: A 
short-term variable which consists of the stock of laws passed during the past three years, and a 
long-term variable which aggregates the number of laws that are older than three years. In other 
words, we are imposing identical coefficients for lags in each of these time periods. We are 
interested in emissions intensity, rather than absolute emissions, to control for confounding factors 
related to population and the economy.  
Formally, we estimate different versions of the following equation: 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 + 𝛾𝛾𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖            (11) 
where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represents the log of emissions intensity in country 𝑖𝑖 at year 𝑡𝑡, that is 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≡ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖⁄ ). 
We measure emissions in three different ways,  𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = {𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖/𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖} where 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 denote 
production and consumption emissions. Therefore, measures one and two concern production and 
consumption emissions, respectively, while the third measure produces estimates for our leakage 
metric, Φ𝑖𝑖 .   
On the right-hand side,  𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 ≡ ∑ 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖(𝑖𝑖−𝑘𝑘)3𝑘𝑘=1  is the stock of laws passed in the previous three 
years, which measures the short-term effect of legislation, and 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 ≡  ∑ 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 +  𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖0𝑖𝑖−4𝑘𝑘=1  is the stock 
of laws at the end of year (𝑡𝑡 − 4), which measures the long-term effect of legislation. 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖0 is the 
stock of laws at the outset.  
Vector 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 contains a set of control variables, introduced below. The model is completed by a 
full set of country and year fixed effects (𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 and 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖) and the idiosyncratic error term 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. The country 
effect 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 controls for time-invariant factors such as different socio-economic contexts, political 
cultures and resource endowments (e.g., solar irradiance and fossil fuel reserves). The time fixed 
effect 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖 controls for inter-temporal trends that are uniform across countries, such as global 
progress in climate policy or the fall in clean technology costs.  
Our main way of estimating equation (11) is two-way fixed effect (TWFE) panel regression. . 
This produces the clearest results and provides consistency with Eskander and Fankhauser (2020). 
We cluster the standard errors at the country level to address potential problems with serial 
correlation.  
However, many macroeconomic variables are endogenous, which may result in inconsistent 
estimates when using TWFE (Greene 2010). To resolve this issue, we also use a two-step system 
Generalised Method-of-Moment (GMM) estimation procedure. GMM can control for country 
heterogeneity, short run time effects, and any possible endogeneity between the dependent 
variables and their predictors (Arellano and Bover 1995; Blundell and Bond 1998, 2000). In 
particular, we instrument all explanatory variables, except rule of law and the year effects, with a 
maximum of 1 further lag for the legislation variables and 2 further lags for the other variables. 
Finally, we apply Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimation.  The PPML model 
estimates a Poisson regression by pseudo-maximum likelihood to identify and drop regressors that 
may cause the nonexistence of the pseudo-maximum likelihood estimates (Silva and Tenreyro 
2006, 2010). Based on the maximum-likelihood estimation method, PPML can be used for any 
kind of outcome variable provided that the mean function is correct (Wooldridge 1999).  
3.2 Main data  
The standard accounting convention for measuring the carbon output of countries is production 
emissions. Good data is readily available, in particular for energy-related and industrial process 
emissions. Consumption emissions data are less reliable and more difficult to obtain. They require 
the detailed modelling of economic interdependencies and supply chains, typically through input-
output models, to calculate the emissions embedded in goods and services (Peters 2008).  
We use data from the Global Carbon Project, which collects carbon budget data at the country-
level for both measures (Friedlingstein et al. 2020). Our interest is in carbon emissions, where 
leakage effects are of most concern, although the database also contains information on methane 
and nitrous oxide. Earlier analysis has shown that most climate policies concern carbon emissions, 
rather than the non-CO2 greenhouse gases (Eskander and Fankhauser 2020).  
Figure 1 shows the evolution of production and consumption emissions over time for high-
income countries (both OECD and non-OECD members) countries, which are typically net carbon 
importers, and low- and middle-income countries, which are net carbon exporters on aggregate. 
The net carbon imports of the two groups of countries are shown in Figure 2. 
Figure 1 
Figure 2 
Climate Change Laws of the World includes information on climate change legislation and 
relevant policies for 198 jurisdictions (197 countries plus the European Union). The data are 
continuously updated. We use a version of the data of end-2020, when the database contained 
around 2,000 pieces of legislation and policies of similar standing.  
Data gaps on consumption emissions and in some of the control variables mean we are focusing 
on 98 countries over the period 1997-2017, with the lagged variables going back further. The 98 
countries were responsible for around 90 percent of global carbon emissions during this time. We 
are also excluding climate laws that solely deal with adaptation, leaving a total of 1,056 laws over 
2,058 country-year observations (98 countries × 21 years).    
The 1,056 laws cover a wide range of policy measures and they differ markedly in scope and 
ambition. The most comprehensive laws are overarching framework laws, aimed at creating the 
institutional framework for emission reductions. They typically define an emissions objective (such 
as net zero by 2050) and create the processes and institutions to implement it. However, the 
majority of climate laws are more targeted. They usually concern sector-specific interventions, in 
particular on energy. Tangible initiatives include carbon pricing schemes (either taxes or emissions 
trading systems), support for renewable energy, incentives for or regulation on energy 
conservation, support for low-carbon transport (e.g., emissions standards or subsidies for clean 
cars) and measures to combat deforestation. Since most laws deal with more than one issue and 
energy interventions in particular tend to have economy-wide effects, we think of both overarching 
and sector-specific laws as economy-wide interventions. 
The number of climate laws has risen rapidly over the two decades of interest, from fewer than 
80 relevant laws in our countries of interest in 1997 to over 1,000 relevant laws in 2017.  In 1997 
few countries had more than five climate-relevant laws, but that number has grown steadily and 
the most prolific climate legislators now have more than 25 relevant laws (Figure 3).  For example, 
Brazil has 28 climate-related laws and policies and Spain has 38 (including adaptation laws, which 
are not included here; Eskander et al. 2021). About 40 percent of database entries are legislative 
acts, passed by parliaments, and about 60 percent are executive orders, issued by governments.  
Figure 3 
Our focus on national climate policy means ignoring important initiatives at the sub-national 
level and by non-state actors, which are often significant in countries with federal structures or 
where national engagement with climate change has been intermittent, such as Australia, Brazil, 
Canada and the United States. Conversely, in EU member states a focus on national climate policy 
would ignore the important role of the European Union in national climate policy. To control for 
this, all EU laws are added to the tally of EU member states. 
3.3 Control variables 
The vector of control variables, 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, is similar to Eskander and Fankhauser (2020) and 
summarised in Table 1. All explanatory variables are lagged by one period, denoted by (-1). 
The first control variable concerns the effectiveness with which laws are implemented. Our 
chosen indicator for implementation effectiveness is the Rule of Law variable from the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators, which captures “perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence 
in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property 
rights, the police, and the court” (Kaufman et al. 2010). The original scale was converted into a 




 . In one of our specifications, the rule-of-law variable is 
interacted with the number of laws, so that the stock of law variables take the alternative form  
?̆?𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 ≡ ∑ 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖(𝑖𝑖−𝑘𝑘)𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖(𝑖𝑖−𝑘𝑘)3𝑘𝑘=1  and ?̆?𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 ≡  ∑ 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 +  ?̆?𝑆𝑖𝑖0𝑖𝑖−4𝑘𝑘=1 .   
The next set of controls are economic variables. GDP per capita controls for the possibility of 
an environmental Kuznets curve (Stern 2004). Two further variables, import share and the size of 
the service sector, control for changes in economic structure that may affect the emissions profile. 
All three variables are taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database.  
Greenhouse gas emissions are subject to annual fluctuations, related in particular to the business 
cycle and weather. We control for this by including two variables that measure, respectively, the 
cyclical component of economic activity and deviation from average air temperature. The cyclical 
component of GDP is based on a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) decomposition, an established 
macroeconomics method to measure business cycle fluctuations, which is calculated by standard 
statistical packages (Hodrick and Prescott 1997). Fluctuations in air temperature are the difference 
between annual average temperatures and the long-term (1980-2015) average. Both temperature 
records come from the World Bank’s Climate Knowledge Portal. 
4. Results 
4.1 Emissions  
We start by investigating the effects of climate legislation on production and consumption 
emissions. Dependent variables are the natural log of carbon intensity, that is, per-$ production and 
consumption emissions, which are denoted by 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝) and 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑑𝑑), respectively, where 𝑝𝑝 = 𝑃𝑃/𝑌𝑌 and 
𝑑𝑑 = 𝐷𝐷/𝑌𝑌. 
Results are shown in Table 2. They are fairly consistent across the three estimation methods 
and in line with Eskander and Fankhauser (2020) who focused on production emissions but had a 
a larger panel of 133 countries. The TWFE results show a significant negative effect of both recent 
and older legislation on carbon intensity, that is annual emissions per GDP.  With GMM and PPML 
the impact of laws is significant and negative only over the longer term.  
As the dependent variables are in logarithmic form, the regression coefficients of interest 
denote semi-elasticities and can be interpreted as the marginal effects of laws on emissions: the 
percentage change in emissions due to an additional climate change law.  In the short term (during 
the first three years), each new climate law reduces annual production emissions per GDP by up to 
0.42% and annual consumption emissions per GDP by up to 0.38%. This is a level effect, that is, 
whole the emissions trajectory is shifted downward by this amount.  
The long-term impact of laws, across the three estimation techniques, is a significant reduction 
in carbon intensity of 7.6–10.1% for production emissions and 8.8–12.3% for consumption 
emissions.  
[Table 2] 
While the differences between consumption and production emissions are small, they suggest 
that climate legislation has a (slightly) larger impact on production emissions in the short term, and 
a (slightly) larger impact on consumption emissions in the longer term. We will explore in the next 
section to what extend these differences translate into statistically significant leakage rates.  
The results for the control variables are consistent with Eskander and Fankhauser (2020) and 
discussed further there. The significant rule of law variable highlights the importance of effective 
government for successful climate policy. We return to this issue when discussing alternative 
specifications below. There is an inverted u-shaped relationship between (the log of) emissions and 
(the log of) GDP per capita, similar to an environmental Kuznets curve. The positive correlation 
between emissions and the cyclical component of GDP (the HP variable) confirms that carbon 
emissions are more cyclically volatile than economic output, as the literature suggests (Doda 2014). 
Trade openness (measured through import share) is associated with higher emissions, while air 
temperatures are associated with a lower carbon intensity, reflecting the high importance of space 
heating, relative to cooling, in many countries.  
4.2 Leakage  
To investigate the effects of climate change legislation on carbon leakage, we use two different 
dependent variables. In the first specification, which we also use in the subsequent alternative 
configurations, the dependent variable is the logged ratio of consumption and production 
emissions, defined as 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐷𝐷/𝑃𝑃). (Note that the per-$ term drops out, i.e., 𝐷𝐷/𝑃𝑃 = 𝑑𝑑/𝑝𝑝). Because of 
the logarithmic form of the dependent variable, the regression coefficients of interest have an 
intuitive interpretation. They measure the percentage change in net carbon imports over the short 
and long run due to an additional climate change law, that is,  �𝛿𝛿𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖
𝛿𝛿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖  � −   
𝛿𝛿𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖
𝛿𝛿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 � �.  
Because of the different denominators, the numerator of this expression does not correspond to 
equation (8). The terms for the carbon content of domestic consumption, (𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖′𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 +  𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖′𝜋𝜋′), do not 
fully cancel out. To remedy this, we use a second dependent variable, which measures the 
difference (rather than the ratio) in consumption and production emissions. To avoid negative 
expressions, a constant shift variable is added, and the dependent variable becomes 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(?̅?𝑝 − 𝑝𝑝 + 𝑑𝑑), 
where ?̅?𝑝 is the maximum production emissions intensity observed over the estimating sample. 
The leakage results are reported in Table 3. We find that the small differences between 
production and consumption emissions observed above do not translate into substantial carbon 
leakage rates.  We do not find a statistically significant impact on net carbon imports within the 
first three years of passing a climate law. That is, there is no evidence of carbon leakage over the 
short-term. 
[Table 3] 
We find a significant impact of older climate laws on carbon leakage, but the effect is small 
and somewhat surprisingly the relationship is negative. The long-term effect of passing a new 
climate law is to reduce net carbon imports per GDP by 0. 07–0.22%.  It appears that factors such 
as fuel substitution effects, technology spillovers and policy diffusion, which the literature 
identifies as potential sources of negative leakage but which take a while to materialise, ultimately 
dominate all other leakage channels (per equation 8 above). 
4.3 Alternative specifications  
We next consider two alternative specifications to refine our results and test their robustness. 
While corroborating the main results, the two alternatives offer interesting further insights into 
leakage patterns. 
In the first alternative, we explore the role of national income levels on leakage rates. We do 
this by splitting the sample into 43 high-income countries and 55 low- and middle-income 
countries, using the standard World Bank income classification. We are interested in this 
distinction not least because most high-income countries are net carbon-importers, while low- and 
middle-income countries are net carbon exporters on aggregate (see Figure 2 above).  
We find that the impact of climate legislation on production and consumption emissions is more 
pronounced in high-income countries, particularly in the short-term.  The leakage rate is significant 
only in high-income countries, and it is again negative. While this reinforces our conclusion that 
unilateral climate policy has not increased emissions abroad, it suggests that the negative leakage 
rates we identified may be limited to rich countries. 
[Table 4] 
The second alternative specification concerns the treatment of government effectiveness.  We 
know that the enforcement of climate laws is as important as their content. In the original 
specification, this is captured in the “rule of law” index (Kaufman et al. 2010), which enters the 
regression as a separate variable. In this alternative specification, we instead consider the 
interactions between the legislation and “rule of law” variables, similar to Eskander and Fankhauser 
(2020).  The results are shown in Table 5. They confirm the importance of implementation, but are 
broadly in line with the main results. 
[Table 5] 
5. Conclusions 
There is intense concern among policy makers about the risk of carbon leakage from unilateral 
climate action, but the literature offers no consensus on the importance or magnitude of this effect. 
Ex ante simulation models can produce both very high and very low leakage rates, depending on 
model specifications and parameter assumptions.  Adopting a new definition of carbon leakage, we 
provide ex post evidence of the long-term impact of climate change policy on net carbon imports 
(our measure of leakage) between 1997 and 2017.  
We find that the passage of new climate change laws has had a significant effect on both 
production and consumption emissions, but the impact on leakage rates has been small, especially 
in the short run (defined as the first three years a law is in effect). Over the long term, leakage rates 
in rich countries may  have been negative.  This is consistent with ex post studies on the impact of 
climate policy on competitiveness, which tend to find only small effects. 
Of course, past leakage rates are not necessarily a good guide to the future impact of climate 
policies. The leakage rates of the future might be different from those observed over the past 20 
years. A number of factors will be at play. 
Most countries are expected to strengthen their climate policies over the coming decade in line 
with their nationally determined contributions to the Paris Agreement. This should reduce the 
overall heterogeneity in climate policies, as national ambitions begin to converge. Less policy 
divergence implies lower leakage rates, as the global playing field becomes more level.  
There will be stragglers. The ratcheting up of ambitions will increase the gap between the bulk 
of countries, which seek to be Paris-aligned, and a smaller, but potentially important group of 
countries that do not. Current nationally determined contributions are still some way off from 
meeting the “well below 2°C” objective of the Paris Agreement. The gap in climate ambition that 
this opens might increase leakage to this second group of countries.  
However, leakage rates are not exogenous, they are a function of carbon policy design. The 
leading countries on climate action are increasingly willing to put in place measures to prevent 
carbon leakage and mitigate competitiveness effects. Interest in border carbon adjustment 
mechanisms, in particular, has moved from the academic into the policy debate. To the extent that 
such policies are effective, this will help to reduce leakage rates.   
Interest in border carbon adjustments is part of a wider shift in attitudes toward free trade, 
which could also affect carbon imports and exports.  COVID-19 has demonstrated the potential 
benefits of shorter, more resilient supply-chains and the strategic importance of domestic control 
over key goods, such as vaccines and information technology but also clean technology.  Even 
before the pandemic, global sentiment has become more cautious about free trade than 
governments have been in the past. Less trade in goods and services probably also means less trade 
in embedded carbon. 
The overall impact of these trends could well be that carbon leakage remains modest, as it has 
been so far.  
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Figures 
 
Figure 1 – Production and consumption emissions, 1997-2017 
 
Note: The horizontal axis measures total CO2 emissions in the country groupings of interest. Total production 
emissions in all countries equal total consumption emissions by definition as total carbon exports equal total 
carbon imports on aggregate. Data used are from 98 countries (43 high-income and 55 low/middle-income countries) 
over the period 1997-2017. 
Source: Friedlingstein et al. (2019). 
  
Figure 2 – Net carbon imports, 1997-2017 
 
Note: Net carbon imports are the difference between consumption emissions and production emissions, per 
equation (6). Data used are from 98 countries (43 high-income and 55 low/middle-income countries) over the period 
1997-2017. 
Source: calculated from Friedlingstein et al. (2019). 
  




Note: The graph shows the probability distribution of the number of climate laws per country in the 98 countries 
(43 high-income and 55 low/middle-income countries) of interest.  






Table 1 - Variables description and summary statistics 
      
Variables Description  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum  Maximum  
      
Total production 
emissions 
Total production emissions (Mt CO2e), includes 
exports and excludes imports 
285.7 944.5 3.664 9,838 
Total consumption 
emissions  
Total consumption emissions (Mt CO2e), excludes 
exports and includes imports 
285.6 888.3 3.664 8,548 
𝑝𝑝  Production emissions per $1 GDP (kg CO2e) 0.268 0.171 0.0478 1.469 
𝑑𝑑  Consumption emissions per $1 GDP (kg CO2e) 0.287 0.140 0.0533 1.367 
Net carbon imports Total carbon imports (Mt), defined as the linear 
difference between total consumption and 
production emissions 
-0.0498 126.4 -1,502 502.0 
(𝑑𝑑 − 𝑝𝑝)  Net carbon imports per $1 GDP (kg CO2), defined 
as the linear difference between per $1 consumption 
and production emissions 
0.0198 0.0828 -0.557 0.526 
𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐷𝐷/𝑃𝑃)  Natural logs of the ratio of consumption and 
production emissions 
0.136 0.294 -0.916 1.649 
Recent laws Stock of mitigation laws in last 3 years in country 𝑖𝑖 
in year 𝑡𝑡 
1.757 2.629 0 20 
Older laws Stock of mitigation laws prior to last 3 years in 
country 𝑖𝑖 in year 𝑡𝑡 
5.939 8.641 0 57 
Rule of Law  Rule of law, rescaled to the range [0,1] 0.609 0.207 0.160 1 
GDP GDP per capita PPP, 2017 international $ 23,633 20,829 691.2 115,415 
HP filter  GDP HP filter 0.000358 0.0199 -0.158 0.106 
Import share Import as percent share of GDP 43.11 24.58 8.397 208.3 
Service share Service as percent share of GDP 54.86 9.526 21.76 79.33 
Temperature  Deviation of annual temperature from long-term 
trend  
0.336 0.482 -1.726 2.460 
      
No. of Countries 98     
No. of Years 21     
No. of Obs. 2,058     
      
Notes: Summary statistics covers data from 98 countries (43 high-income and 55 low/middle-income countries) over 
the period 1997-2017. Emissions data comes from Friedlingstein et al. (2019), legislation data are obtained from 





Table 2 – Legislation and emissions 
         
 Two-way FE results  GMM results  PPML results 
Variables 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝) 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑑𝑑)  𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝) 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑑𝑑)  𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝) 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑑𝑑) 
         
Recent laws (-1) -0.0042* -0.0038  -0.0049 -0.0032  -0.0043 -0.0031 
 (0.0023) (0.0024)  (0.0067) (0.0070)  (0.0027) (0.0026) 
Older laws (-1) -0.0101*** -0.0123***  -0.0076* -0.0088*  -0.0101*** -0.0122*** 
 (0.0015) (0.0017)  (0.0044) (0.0050)  (0.0016) (0.0018) 
Rule of law (-1) -0.2082 -0.2142  -0.3727 0.9270  -0.5273 -0.5708 
 (0.2750) (0.2452)  (0.6637) (1.0555)  (0.4576) (0.3867) 
HP filter (-1) 0.4157* 0.7728***  -1.3712* -0.2480  0.3585* 0.7530*** 
 (0.2297) (0.2365)  (0.7285) (0.8381)  (0.1930) (0.2280) 
Ln(GDP) (-1) 1.7862*** 1.6992**  2.8895** 3.7316***  1.2412 1.0968 
 (0.5112) (0.6690)  (1.1712) (1.3922)  (0.8109) (0.8250) 
(Ln(GDP))2 (-1) -0.1177*** -0.1139***  -0.1487** -0.2058***  -0.0886** -0.0803* 
 (0.0259) (0.0362)  (0.0628) (0.0763)  (0.0397) (0.0427) 
Import share (-1) 0.0022 0.0044**  0.0045* 0.0068***  0.0024* 0.0044** 
 (0.0014) (0.0019)  (0.0024) (0.0021)  (0.0014) (0.0017) 
Services share (-1) -0.0042 -0.0052  -0.0041 0.0024  -0.0012 -0.0029 
 (0.0032) (0.0032)  (0.0061) (0.0058)  (0.0044) (0.0039) 
Temperature (-1) -0.0224** -0.0102  0.1688 0.1135  -0.0397** -0.0176 
 (0.0107) (0.0107)  (0.1141) (0.0706)  (0.0179) (0.0150) 
Constant -7.3384*** -6.7513**  -15.2250*** -19.0696***  -4.4697 -3.8036 
 (2.5632) (3.1126)  (5.4842) (6.4589)  (4.0462) (3.9606) 
         
No. of Obs. 2,058 2,058  2,058 2,058  2,058 2,058 
R2 (within) / Pseudo-R2 0.252 0.233     0.0812 0.0484 
No. of countries 98 98  98 98  98 98 
No. of Years 21 21  21 21  21 21 
Country FE YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Year FE YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Hansen p    0.0605 0.0657    
Hansen df    20 20    
No. of instruments    50 50    
         
Notes: Corrected/cluster-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent statistical 
significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. The dependent variables are the natural log of per-$ production 
and consumption emissions, denoted by 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝) and 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑑𝑑) respectively, 𝑑𝑑 = 𝐷𝐷/𝑌𝑌 and 𝑝𝑝 = 𝑃𝑃/𝑌𝑌. Country and Year 
fixed effects are included in all of the estimations. All control variables are lagged by 1-period, denoted by (-1). A 
balanced panel of 98 countries over 1997-2017 forms our estimating sample in all the estimations.  
Blundell–Bond estimation is by two-step GMM procedure. All variables, except rule of law and the year effects are 
instrumented with a maximum of 1 further lag for the legislation variables and 2 further lags for the other variables. 
The figures reported for the Hansen over-identification test, are p-values for the null hypothesis of valid instruments 
with 𝜒𝜒2. Total number of instruments is 50.  
 
  
Table 3 – Legislation and carbon leakage 
   
Variables 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐷𝐷/𝑃𝑃) 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(?̅?𝑝 − 𝑝𝑝 + 𝑑𝑑) 
   
Recent laws (-1) 0.0004 -0.0002 
 (0.0023) (0.0006) 
Older laws (-1) -0.0022* -0.0007*** 
 (0.0013) (0.0002) 
Rule of law (-1) -0.0060 -0.0249 
 (0.2376) (0.0443) 
HP filter (-1) 0.3572 0.0791 
 (0.2790) (0.0565) 
Ln(GDP) (-1) -0.0871 0.0065 
 (0.3565) (0.0882) 
(Ln(GDP))2 (-1) 0.0038 0.0003 
 (0.0194) (0.0050) 
Import share (-1) 0.0022 0.0004 
 (0.0015) (0.0003) 
Services share (-1) -0.0010 -0.0005 
 (0.0023) (0.0005) 
Temperature (-1) 0.0121 0.0055** 
 (0.0083) (0.0025) 
Constant 0.5871 0.3334 
 (1.6754) (0.3877) 
   
No. of Obs. 2,058 2,058 
R2 (within) 0.0124 0.0258 
No. of countries 98 98 
No. of Years 21 21 
Country FE YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
   
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at 1, 5 
and 10 percent levels, respectively. The dependent variables are 1) logged ratio of production and consumption 
emissions, defined as 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐷𝐷/𝑃𝑃), and 2) logged difference between per-$ consumption and production emissions, plus 
a constant shift variable to avoid negative expressions, that is 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(?̅?𝑝 − 𝑝𝑝 + 𝑑𝑑) where ?̅?𝑝 is the maximum production 
emissions over the estimating sample. Country and Year fixed effects are included in all of the estimations. All control 
variables are lagged by 1-period, denoted by (-1). A balanced panel of 98 countries over 1997-2017 forms our 
estimating sample in all the estimations.  
  
Table 4 – Emissions and leakage by income groups 
        
 High-income countries  Low/Middle-income countries 
 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝) 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑑𝑑) 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐷𝐷/𝑃𝑃)  𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝) 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑑𝑑) 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐷𝐷/𝑃𝑃) 
        
Recent laws (-1) -0.0049** -0.0017 0.0032  0.0012 -0.0023 -0.0036 
 (0.0022) (0.0027) (0.0024)  (0.0057) (0.0062) (0.0048) 
Older laws (-1) -0.0091*** -0.0114*** -0.0023  -0.0079* -0.0090** -0.0011 
 (0.0019) (0.0025) (0.0017)  (0.0041) (0.0042) (0.0026) 
Rule of law (-1) -0.3727 -0.3877 -0.0149  -0.1683 -0.0963 0.0720 
 (0.4261) (0.3345) (0.3372)  (0.3486) (0.3062) (0.3171) 
HP filter (-1) 0.2088 0.6170* 0.4081  0.4830 0.8052** 0.3223 
 (0.2260) (0.3506) (0.3634)  (0.3280) (0.3158) (0.3922) 
Ln(GDP) (-1) 0.7427 -1.7432 -2.4859*  2.0280*** 2.2168** 0.1888 
 (1.6330) (2.5118) (1.2547)  (0.5439) (0.8875) (0.5822) 
(Ln(GDP))2 (-1) -0.0621 0.0587 0.1208*  -0.1339*** -0.1480*** -0.0142 
 (0.0809) (0.1250) (0.0614)  (0.0324) (0.0513) (0.0335) 
Import share (-1) -0.0001 0.0039 0.0040  0.0045** 0.0054*** 0.0009 
 (0.0016) (0.0033) (0.0024)  (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0012) 
Services share (-1) -0.0138*** -0.0153*** -0.0015  0.0004 -0.0013 -0.0017 
 (0.0042) (0.0034) (0.0034)  (0.0033) (0.0035) (0.0029) 
Temperature (-1) -0.0006 0.0085 0.0090  -0.0497** -0.0224 0.0274* 
 (0.0083) (0.0114) (0.0104)  (0.0205) (0.0200) (0.0163) 
Constant -1.1279 11.7190 12.8470*  -9.0189*** -9.4424** -0.4235 
 (8.1320) (12.5283) (6.4749)  (2.4132) (3.9047) (2.5363) 
        
No. of Obs. 903 903 903  1,155 1,155 1,155 
R2 (within) 0.408 0.379 0.0647  0.190 0.175 0.00829 
No. of countries 43 43 43  55 55 55 
No. of Years 21 21 21  21 21 21 
Country FE YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
        
Notes: Results based on TWFE regressions. Cluster-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
represent statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. Dependent variables are the natural log of 
per-$ production and consumption emissions (i.e., 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝) and 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑑𝑑), 𝑑𝑑 = 𝐷𝐷/𝑌𝑌 and 𝑝𝑝 = 𝑃𝑃/𝑌𝑌), and the logged ratio of 
production and consumption emissions (i.e., 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐷𝐷/𝑃𝑃)), respectively. The income classification is according to the 
World Bank. There are 43 high-income and 55 low/middle-income countries in the sample. Country and Year fixed 
effects are included in all of the estimations. All control variables are lagged by 1-period, denoted by (-1).  
 
  
Table 5 – Emissions, leakage and implementation quality 
    
Variables 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝) 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑑𝑑) 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐷𝐷/𝑃𝑃) 
    
Recent laws (-1) × Rule of law (-1) -0.0067** -0.0054* 0.0012 
 (0.0026) (0.0028) (0.0025) 
Older laws (-1) × Rule of law (-1) -0.0122*** -0.0147*** -0.0025 
 (0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0017) 
HP filter (-1) 0.4683** 0.8376*** 0.3693 
 (0.2279) (0.2363) (0.2862) 
Ln(GDP) (-1) 1.6569*** 1.5637** -0.0933 
 (0.5191) (0.6685) (0.3558) 
(Ln(GDP))2 (-1) -0.1127*** -0.1088*** 0.0039 
 (0.0260) (0.0358) (0.0192) 
Import share (-1) 0.0024 0.0046** 0.0022 
 (0.0014) (0.0019) (0.0014) 
Services share (-1) -0.0038 -0.0048 -0.0010 
 (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0023) 
Temperature (-1) -0.0246** -0.0126 0.0120 
 (0.0110) (0.0109) (0.0084) 
Constant -6.7209** -6.0961* 0.6248 
 (2.6030) (3.1352) (1.6876) 
    
No. of Obs. 2,058 2,058 2,058 
R2 (within) 0.257 0.236 0.0121 
No. of countries 98 98 98 
No. of Years 21 21 21 
Country FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
    
Notes: Results based on TWFE regressions. Cluster-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
represent statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. Dependent variables are the natural log of 
per-$ production and consumption emissions (i.e., 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝) and 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑑𝑑), 𝑑𝑑 = 𝐷𝐷/𝑌𝑌 and 𝑝𝑝 = 𝑃𝑃/𝑌𝑌), and the logged ratio of 
production and consumption emissions (i.e., 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐷𝐷/𝑃𝑃)), respectively. Country and Year fixed effects are included in 
all of the estimations. All control variables are lagged by 1-period, denoted by (-1). A balanced panel of 98 countries 
over 1997-2017 forms our estimating sample in all the estimations. 
  
Appendix 
Table A1 - Correlation Analysis 
    
 Outcome variables 
Explanatory variables 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝) 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑑𝑑) 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐷𝐷/𝑃𝑃) 
    
Recent laws -0.15*** -0.11*** 0.12*** 
Older laws -0.17*** -0.15*** 0.12*** 
Rule of law -0.09*** 0.03 0.20*** 
Ln(GDP) -0.04 0.04 0.11*** 
HP filter -0.02 0.00 0.03 
Import share 0.03 0.21*** 0.28*** 
Services share -0.17*** -0.08*** 0.21*** 
Temperature -0.04 -0.02 0.04* 
    
Notes: ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. Outcome variables 
are the per-$ production and consumption emissions, and leakage as defined in Table 1. A balanced panel of 98 
countries over 1997-2017 forms our estimating sample in all the estimations. 
 
Table A2 – Stationarity Tests 
     
Variables t-bar t-tilde-bar Z-t-tilde-bar p-value  
     
𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝)  -1.6739 -1.4670 -0.8516 0.1972 
𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑑𝑑)  -1.6986 -1.4970 -1.2368 0.1081 
𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐷𝐷/𝑃𝑃)  -2.6640 -2.1980 -10.2303 0.0000 
Recent laws     
Older laws     
Rule of laws -1.6791 -1.5310 -1.6729 0.0472 
Ln(GDP) -0.8143 -0.7466 8.3900 1.0000 
(Ln(GDP))2 -0.7034 -0.6581 9.5256 1.0000 
HP filter -3.4947 -2.7326 -17.0892 0.0000 
Import share -1.7097 -1.5792 -2.2917 0.0110 
Service share -1.5277 -1.4079 -0.0932 0.4629 
Temperature  -3.7763 -2.8492 -18.5844 0.0000 
     
No. of countries 98    
No. of years 21    
     
Notes. Im-Pesaran-Shin unit-root test is used, where ADF regressions do not include lags. Null and alternative 
hypotheses, respectively, are: Ho: All panels contain unit roots; and Ha: Some panels are stationary. There are 98 
panels and 21 periods (years). 
  
Table A3 – Cointegration Tests 
    
Variables 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝) 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑑𝑑) 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐷𝐷/𝑃𝑃) 
    
Modified Dickey-Fuller t -8.6381*** -7.8001*** -15.7016*** 
Dickey-Fuller t -9.4216*** -8.9491*** -15.5633*** 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller t -5.4044*** -3.5195*** -9.0469*** 
Unadjusted modified Dickey -14.9948*** -15.4893*** -26.3402*** 
Unadjusted Dickey-Fuller t -11.8023*** -11.9558*** -18.4905*** 
    
No. of countries 98 98 98 
No. of years 19 19 19 
    
Notes. Kao test for cointegration is used. Null and alternative hypotheses, respectively, are: Ho: No cointegration; Ha: 










Table S1 – Alternative Definitions of Legislation 
        
 Stock of laws  Flow of new laws 
Variables 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝) 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑑𝑑) 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐷𝐷/𝑃𝑃)  𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝) 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑑𝑑) 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐷𝐷/𝑃𝑃) 
        
Stock of laws (-1) -0.0089*** -0.0106*** -0.0017     
 (0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0011)     
Flow of new laws (-1)     -0.0076** -0.0077** -0.0001 
     (0.0029) (0.0034) (0.0030) 
Rule of law (-1) -0.1895 -0.1872 0.0023  -0.1324 -0.1207 0.0117 
 (0.2716) (0.2459) (0.2402)  (0.3060) (0.2748) (0.2381) 
HP filter (-1) 0.4027* 0.7542*** 0.3515  0.4699* 0.8388*** 0.3689 
 (0.2299) (0.2377) (0.2788)  (0.2391) (0.2367) (0.2769) 
Ln(GDP) (-1) 1.7900*** 1.7046** -0.0854  2.4860*** 2.5405*** 0.0545 
 (0.5148) (0.6744) (0.3566)  (0.5108) (0.6751) (0.3582) 
(Ln(GDP))2 (-1) -0.1178*** -0.1141*** 0.0037  -0.1547*** -0.1583*** -0.0037 
 (0.0261) (0.0364) (0.0194)  (0.0260) (0.0365) (0.0195) 
Import share (-1) 0.0022 0.0044** 0.0022  0.0009 0.0028 0.0019 
 (0.0014) (0.0019) (0.0015)  (0.0015) (0.0019) (0.0015) 
Services share (-1) -0.0041 -0.0051 -0.0010  -0.0047 -0.0058* -0.0011 
 (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0023)  (0.0034) (0.0035) (0.0023) 
Temperature (-1) -0.0247** -0.0136 0.0111  -0.0304*** -0.0205* 0.0099 
 (0.0106) (0.0105) (0.0084)  (0.0111) (0.0114) (0.0085) 
Constant -7.3751*** -6.8043** 0.5708  -10.6191*** -10.6981*** -0.0790 
 (2.5798) (3.1412) (1.6735)  (2.5734) (3.1428) (1.6799) 
        
No. of Obs. 2,058 2,058 2,058  2,058 2,058 2,058 
R2 (within) 0.249 0.229 0.0118  0.190 0.163 0.00951 
No. of countries 98 98 98  98 98 98 
No. of Years 21 21 21  21 21 21 
Country FE YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
        
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at 1, 5 
and 10 percent levels, respectively. Dependent variables are the natural log of per-$ production and consumption 
emissions (i.e., 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝) and 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑑𝑑), 𝑑𝑑 = 𝐷𝐷/𝑌𝑌 and 𝑝𝑝 = 𝑃𝑃/𝑌𝑌), and the logged ratio of production and consumption 
emissions (i.e., 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐷𝐷/𝑃𝑃)), respectively. Stock of laws refers to the total number of climate laws that are in force in a 
country in a given year, whereas the flow of laws refers to the number of new climate laws enacted in a country in a 
given year. Country and Year fixed effects are included in all of the estimations. All control variables are lagged by 1-




Table S2 – Dynamic Specifications 
        
 Two-way FE Results  GMM Results 
Variables 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝) 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑑𝑑) 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐷𝐷/𝑃𝑃)  𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝) 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑑𝑑) 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐷𝐷/𝑃𝑃) 
        
𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝) (-1) 0.6321***    0.9070***   
 (0.0387)    (0.0373)   
𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑑𝑑) (-1)  0.6059***    0.9641***  
  (0.0431)    (0.0429)  
𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐷𝐷/𝑃𝑃) (-1)   0.4197***    0.7758*** 
   (0.0396)    (0.0909) 
Recent laws (-1) -0.0023* -0.0017 0.0006  -0.0016 -0.0005 0.0006 
 (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0016)  (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0027) 
Older laws (-1) -0.0037*** -0.0051*** -0.0015*  -0.0011 -0.0005 -0.0014 
 (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0008)  (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0013) 
Rule of law (-1) -0.1591 -0.1636 -0.0035  -0.1593 -0.2226 0.1028 
 (0.1146) (0.1123) (0.1409)  (0.1423) (0.1520) (0.2758) 
HP filter (-1) 0.2494 0.2922 0.1347  -0.7967 -0.3438 -0.0333 
 (0.1595) (0.2117) (0.2108)  (0.4942) (0.3618) (0.3605) 
Ln(GDP) (-1) 0.6231*** 0.5450* -0.1142  0.1883 -0.0317 -0.2014 
 (0.2170) (0.3257) (0.2298)  (0.1985) (0.1857) (0.2505) 
(Ln(GDP))2 (-1) -0.0396*** -0.0368** 0.0054  -0.0083 0.0035 0.0096 
 (0.0113) (0.0179) (0.0126)  (0.0103) (0.0106) (0.0132) 
Import share (-1) 0.0009* 0.0015 0.0010  -0.0001 0.0001 0.0010* 
 (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0009)  (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0005) 
Services share (-1) -0.0012 -0.0018 -0.0006  0.0004 -0.0003 0.0004 
 (0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0016)  (0.0018) (0.0013) (0.0018) 
Temperature (-1) -0.0039 0.0054 0.0107  0.0218 0.0407 0.0272 
 (0.0069) (0.0086) (0.0081)  (0.0244) (0.0269) (0.0337) 
Constant -2.7026** -2.1808 0.6748  -1.0746 0.0246 0.9413 
 (1.0799) (1.5027) (1.0673)  (0.9247) (0.9129) (1.1355) 
        
No. of Obs. 2,058 2,058 2,058  2,058 2,058 2,058 
R2 (within) 0.563 0.515 0.188     
No. of countries 98 98 98  98 98 98 
No. of Years 21 21 21  21 21 21 
Country FE YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Hansen p     0.268 0.543 0.321 
Hansen df     19 19 19 
No. of instruments     50 50 50 
        
Notes: Corrected/cluster-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent statistical 
significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. Dependent variables are the natural log of per-$ production and 
consumption emissions (i.e., 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝) and 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑑𝑑), 𝑑𝑑 = 𝐷𝐷/𝑌𝑌 and 𝑝𝑝 = 𝑃𝑃/𝑌𝑌), and the logged ratio of production and 
consumption emissions (i.e., 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐷𝐷/𝑃𝑃)), respectively. This dynamic specification includes the autoregressive term, i.e., 
the first lag of the dependent variable, as an additional explanatory variable. Country and Year fixed effects are 
included in all of the estimations. All control variables are lagged by 1-period, denoted by (-1). A balanced panel of 
98 countries over 1997-2017 forms our estimating sample in all the estimations.  
  
Table S3 – Emissions and Leakage: OECD Countries only 
    
Variables 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝) 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑑𝑑) 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐷𝐷/𝑃𝑃) 
    
Recent laws (-1) -0.0053* -0.0032* 0.0021 
 (0.0026) (0.0018) (0.0019) 
Older laws (-1) -0.0041* -0.0079*** -0.0038* 
 (0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0020) 
Rule of law (-1) -0.3476 -0.4108 -0.0632 
 (0.3820) (0.3829) (0.4301) 
HP filter (-1) 0.0839 -0.3950 -0.4789 
 (0.4599) (0.5866) (0.4628) 
Ln(GDP) (-1) -2.3831 -5.2941 -2.9110** 
 (3.2359) (3.8503) (1.3786) 
(Ln(GDP))2 (-1) 0.0967 0.2322 0.1355* 
 (0.1652) (0.1945) (0.0666) 
Import share (-1) 0.0004 0.0077** 0.0073** 
 (0.0012) (0.0032) (0.0030) 
Services share (-1) -0.0048 -0.0051 -0.0003 
 (0.0050) (0.0073) (0.0067) 
Temperature (-1) -0.0075 0.0243 0.0318** 
 (0.0116) (0.0193) (0.0125) 
Constant 13.5138 29.0917 15.5780** 
 (15.6859) (18.6299) (7.0803) 
    
No. of Obs. 483 483 483 
R2 (within) 0.289 0.366 0.223 
No. of countries 23 23 23 
No. of Years 21 21 21 
Country FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
    
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at 1, 5 
and 10 percent levels, respectively. Dependent variables are the natural log of per-$ production and consumption 
emissions (i.e., 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝) and 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑑𝑑), 𝑑𝑑 = 𝐷𝐷/𝑌𝑌 and 𝑝𝑝 = 𝑃𝑃/𝑌𝑌), and the logged ratio of production and consumption 
emissions (i.e., 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐷𝐷/𝑃𝑃)), respectively. Country and Year fixed effects are included in all of the estimations. All 
control variables are lagged by 1-period, denoted by (-1). A balanced panel of 23 OECD countries over 1997-2017 




Table S4 – Median regressions as robustness check 
    
Variables 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝) 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑑𝑑) 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐷𝐷/𝑃𝑃) 
    
Recent laws (-1) -0.0042 -0.0037 0.0004 
 (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0044) 
Older laws (-1) -0.0101*** -0.0123*** -0.0023 
 (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0019) 
Rule of law (-1) -0.2065 -0.2153 -0.0058 
 (0.2131) (0.2138) (0.3330) 
HP filter (-1) 0.4292 0.7796* 0.3549 
 (0.4177) (0.4170) (0.5760) 
Ln(GDP) (-1) 1.7748*** 1.6843*** -0.0712 
 (0.3953) (0.4175) (0.6599) 
(Ln(GDP))2 (-1) -0.1172*** -0.1131*** 0.0029 
 (0.0211) (0.0227) (0.0358) 
Import share (-1) 0.0022* 0.0044*** 0.0022 
 (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0019) 
Services share (-1) -0.0041 -0.0052* -0.0009 
 (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0033) 
Temperature (-1) -0.0230* -0.0104 0.0125 
 (0.0132) (0.0136) (0.0204) 
    
No. of Obs. 2,058 2,058 2,058 
No. of countries 98 98 98 
No. of Years 21 21 21 
Country FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
    
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent 
levels, respectively. Dependent variables are the natural log of per-$ production and consumption emissions (i.e., 
𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝) and 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑑𝑑), 𝑑𝑑 = 𝐷𝐷/𝑌𝑌 and 𝑝𝑝 = 𝑃𝑃/𝑌𝑌), and the logged ratio of production and consumption emissions (i.e., 
𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐷𝐷/𝑃𝑃)), respectively. Country and Year fixed effects are included in all of the estimations. All control variables are 
lagged by 1-period, denoted by (-1). A balanced panel of 98 countries over 1997-2017 forms our estimating sample in 
all the estimations.  
  
 
